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BY: 0664393

**PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PLAN
FOR EXPLAINING U.S. CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY
IN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA**

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BACKGROUND

The Sandinistas came to power in July 1979 in a coalition with genuine democrats. However, within weeks the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) began a pattern of actions reflecting a betrayal of the revolution: internal repression of genuine democrats and of non-communist institutions such as religious organizations; aggression against fellow Latin American countries through armed subversion; ties with terrorist organizations in Latin America, the Middle East, and Europe; and a military buildup supported by the Soviet bloc and Cuba. That pattern continues today.

Under President Reagan, a balanced U.S. policy has been followed in Central America. It contains four mutually reinforcing elements:

1. Encouragement of democracy;
2. Economic aid to improve living conditions;
3. Active diplomacy for realistic political solutions;
4. Security assistance to give the people of Central America the means to defend themselves against expanded Soviet-bloc/Cuban/Nicaraguan subversion or armed aggression.

Much progress has been made in four of the five Central American countries since 1981: Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala are democratic and are steadily strengthening their democratic institutions. The U.S. Congress has year by year provided support for the President's policy through increasing appropriations for economic and security assistance (total amounts by fiscal year 1983--\$513 million; 1984--\$939 million; 1985--\$951 million; 1986--\$1,014 million).

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GOALS

- To convince audiences in Central and South America (particularly the Contadora and Contadora Support Group countries) and in Europe that U.S. policy toward Central America is balanced, workable, and the best alternative possible.
- To convince audiences in Latin America and Europe that the Nicaraguan democratic resistance has a cohesive and credible political program and that it is a viable, democratic force worthy of the support of the U.S. and other democratic nations.
- To demonstrate to audiences in Latin America and Europe that the Sandinistas support international terrorism and that Sandinista external subversion threatens the nascent democracies in neighboring countries.
- To demonstrate that the Sandinistas consciously and systematically violate human rights.
- To convince audiences in Latin America and Europe that the United States seeks only that the Sandinistas deliver on their promises of 1979 to the Organization of American States; that we believe that the best way to do this is for the Sandinistas to engage in dialogue with the opposition; that the Contadora process, if it can meet our three requirements that it be comprehensive, simultaneous, and verifiable, is an alternative we can support.
- To demonstrate to audiences in Latin America and Europe how Sandinista ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union adversely affect U.S. and their own national security interests.
- To persuade the internationals (Socialist International, Christian Democrats, International Democrat Union, etc.) to speak out on their concern for civil and human rights in Nicaragua, Sandinista intervention in neighboring countries, and Sandinista ties with international terrorists; and to encourage the internationals to oppose aid to the Sandinistas for the same reasons.
- To counter Sandinista disinformation activities with facts.

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ADDITIONAL GOALS IN LATIN AMERICA

- To convince the countries of Central America that the United States shares their political and economic goals and can be counted upon to stick with them for the long haul (the U.S. is a reliable ally).
- To persuade Central American government, political, church, and labor leaders to be more active in telling the Central American story in Europe, South America, Mexico, and the Caribbean.

ADDITIONAL GOAL IN EUROPE

- To convince European publics that the U.S. is responding in a constructive manner to the desires of Central American nations for political and economic reform.

THEMES

- Stress positive aspects (economic development, promotion of democracy, security) of U.S. policy in Central America.
- Set record straight on U.S. policy toward negotiations with Nicaragua and on Contadora, including Nicaraguan refusal to negotiate a comprehensive agreement and U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan resistance.
- Emphasize democratic background and objectives of the Nicaraguan resistance, while reiterating totalitarian nature of the Sandinista regime. Point out militaristic and undemocratic Sandinista educational system; exploit existence of neighborhood committees and internal repression. Remind audiences of Sandinista efforts to crush internal opponents, especially the Catholic Church, political parties, and labor unions not controlled by the government. Focus on new Nicaraguan constitution when it is unveiled by the Sandinistas and on totally controlled process in which constitution will be subjected to "public discussion."
- Reemphasize progress and successes in El Salvador, while publicizing the destructive and totalitarian nature of the Salvadoran guerrillas.

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- Explain that the United States supports those people and governments who are furthering the democratic process--in Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador--and seeking to foster reconciliation and the democratic process in Nicaragua.
- Remind audiences of Sandinista and Salvadoran guerrilla ties with terrorists in Latin America (example, M-19 in Colombia) and elsewhere (including Middle East), arms and drug runners, and of their Soviet-Cuban ties. Mention Sandinista practice of giving Nicaraguan passports to terrorists.
- Continue to present U.S. position on, and rationale for, withdrawal from Nicaraguan case before the International Court of Justice. Note: The ICJ decision on the merits of the Nicaraguan case, expected in May, will spark Nicaraguan attempts to garner support for calls for the U.S. to comply with the Court's rulings, likely including a Nicaraguan approach to the UN Security Council for enforcement of the ICJ's ruling under Article 94(2) of the UN Charter.

ADDITIONAL THEME IN CENTRAL AMERICA

- Europeans do not have a clear understanding of progress toward democracy in Central America, nor do they understand the threat to democracy posed by the Sandinistas. The United States government cannot alone convey that story to Europeans. The Central Americans should take on a share of that task.

AUDIENCES

Political and government leaders in Latin America and Europe
 Media in Latin America and Europe
 The Internationals
 Religious leaders
 Academics

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Note: The following three audiences have ready access to the American news media and to U.S. public opinion data. This will affect their willingness to accept materials and information aimed directly at them.

European and Latin American delegations to the United Nations

Latin American and European diplomatic missions in Washington, D.C.

Latin American and European journalists in the United States

ACTIONS

- Make increased use of WORLDNET as an interactive medium for explaining U.S. policy in Central America (among officials to be sought as spokesmen on Central America are Vice President Bush, Ambassador Walters, Assistant Secretary Abrams, and Ambassador Habib).
- Speech by President Reagan describing his positive vision for Central Americans. This should note our greatly increased economic assistance, including scholarship programs, and our identification with the hopes of the people of the region for a better life. The speech should also note that the door is open for Nicaraguans to share in this prospect--if their Sandinista leaders will allow them the freedom to pursue it. This speech should be a major event delivered on some appropriate occasion, preferably during the June 10-11 visit of the four Central American democratic presidents. Other possibilities might be to have the President speak to the OAS or during either the President Sanguinetti or President Azcona visits.
- A senior Administration official, perhaps Secretary Shultz, should publicly unveil the second annual report on the implementation of the Kissinger Commission (or Jackson Plan) findings. This can be an opportunity to demonstrate that we recognize the North-South dimensions of the problem, and to stress the affirmative part of our strategy.
- For Socialist International in Lima, June 20-23, State will instruct embassies in the countries represented to make demarches to party leaders. USIS Lima will try to place material on Central America in the Peruvian media at that time, and will also distribute ARA/LPD pamphlets presenting U.S. views on Central America.

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- USIA will maintain a steady flow of AMPARTS to Europe and Latin America to speak about Central America. These will be arranged according to the needs identified by posts in their country plans.
- In addition to continuous reporting by its own media, USIA will distribute abroad increased numbers of copies of studies produced by ARA/LPD. USIA will encourage its posts in Europe to translate more ARA/LPD documents into local languages.
- DOD will continue its series of research/study seminars in Latin America on the Strategic Challenges to Regional Security.
- DOD and USIA will distribute the 80-piece slide presentation "The Challenge and Response" to posts in Europe and Latin America. USIA will consider translating the show into local languages.
- Put ARA/LPD sponsored "Arms Display" exhibit at key points in U.S. and overseas.
- ARA/LPD will work closely with IO/UNP to prepare U.S. statements and rights of reply in multilateral fora to counter Sandinista disinformation.
- ARA/LPD and USIA will be prepared to exploit any Nicaraguan intransigence at the Esquipulas, Guatemala, summit (May 24-26), and at the June 6 Contadora meeting (possible Contadora conclusion), and at Contadora negotiating sessions leading up to June 6. ARA/LPD and USIA will also prepare to support positions taken by the Central American democracies.

ACTIONS (Latin America)

- During President Duarte's travel to Costa Rica, Peru, Uruguay, and Brazil, May 9-22, USIS posts at each stop promoted media coverage; USIA media covered in depth.
- At the Costa Rican Inaugural, May 8, the U.S. delegation took the opportunity to meet with Contadora and Contadora support country leaders to demonstrate U.S. support for their goals.

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- During visit of Uruguayan President Sanguinetti to Washington in June, Administration leaders will underscore U.S. support for democracy and economic progress, emphasizing a positive vision, rather than reiterating well-known American opposition to oppression. USIA media will cover in full and also assist Uruguayan media traveling with the president.
- USIA will provide full media coverage and assistance to the working visit of Honduran President Azcona to Washington May 26-29. Appropriate quotes by Azcona will be played into Europe and Latin America.
- ARA/LPD will prepare a cable to Embassies in Central America instructing them to discuss with government officials, political, church, and labor leaders the need to tell the Central American story in Europe. A special effort will be made to persuade President Duarte to begin a public affairs effort in Europe.
- DOD Policy Support Staff prepared special briefing and display materials on Central America for use at the meeting with air force chiefs of staff from 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries May 5-9. Similar materials and briefings will be given to air force intelligence chiefs from 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries when they meet at Homestead AFB, Florida, in August 1986.

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